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Different Styles for Different Needs –
The Effect of Cognitive Styles on
Idea Generation
Carina Lomberg, Tobias Kollmann
and Christoph Stöckmann
Researchers are engaged inﬁnding the precursors for innovation.Drawing onKirton's Adaption-
Innovation (KAI) Inventory, we explicitly test Kirton's central premise that cognitive styles dif-
ferentiate between preferences for producing ideas in a certainway.We argue that the generation
of either a magnitude or original ideas is governed by different underlying cognitive styles. In a
study with 191 individuals, we ﬁnd that the cognitive style originality associates with ideational
ﬂuency whereas the rule governance style associates with the generation of original ideas. By
providing a cognitive explanation for how ideas are generated, we deepen the understanding
of the idea generation process. This is particularly important for the future use of the KAI and
for organizations that strive to be innovative.
Introduction
It has frequently been pointed out that today'srapidly changing and highly competitive
business environment accelerates the need for
innovations among all organizations (e.g., Gino
et al., 2010). In order to maintain and enhance
their effectiveness and competitiveness, organi-
zations strive to be innovative (Amabile, 2000;
Paulus & Nijstad, 2003; Davis, 2009). Individ-
uals contribute to organizational innovation in
the formof the generation of original and poten-
tially valuable ideas concerning products, ser-
vices and processes (Zhou & George, 2001).
Given the importance of ideas for innovation,
the question how these ideas are generated
should be solidly grounded.
Cognitive styles (e.g., Kirton, 1976) have been
shown to be good predictors of creativity over
and above personal attributes (e.g., Harrison
et al., 2002). Hence, to add to a valid explanation
of idea generation, we argue that cognitive pro-
cesses underlying idea generation must be
taken into account. Whereas research on idea
generation has begun to address the cognitive
processes underlying original idea generation
(e.g., Nijstad, Stroebe & Lodewijkx, 2003), little
attention has been paid so far to the question
whether the cognitive mechanisms underlying
originality, i.e., the production of novel ideas,
are different from those underlying ﬂuency,
i.e. the production ofmany ideas.Whereas orig-
inality seems to be necessary for breakthrough
innovation (Taylor & Greve, 2006), the ability
to generate a large numbers of ideas (ﬂuency)
might be useful for innovations that are not
built on a single discovery or invention such as
considering several potential application mar-
kets (O'Connor & McDermott, 2004). As both
kinds of idea generation seem to be crucial for
innovation, we shed light on the question
whether a single person can complementary
possess all cognitive skills required for idea-
tional ﬂuency and original ideas or whether
the cognitive demands are rather contradictory.
We base our analysis on a study with 191 indi-
viduals. Our results show that ideational ﬂu-
ency and originality of generated ideas indeed
depend on the cognitive style of individuals.
Our research contributes to the creative
style–creative level discussion, which has been
debated for more than 40years now, and con-
tradicts Kirton's (1976) initial premise that cog-
nitive styles are not related to creative
outcomes. In doing so, we are among the ﬁrst
to explicitly test Kirton's (1976, 2003) central
premise that cognitive styles differentiate be-
tween preferences for producing ideas in a cer-
tain way (and not the capability to act in a
particular way when asked to do so). Drawing
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on recent ﬁndings by Miron-Spektor, Erez and
Naveh (2011), we further advance the existing
discussion around cognitive effects by not only
examining ﬂuency and originality effects based
on an individual's positioning on the adaption–
innovation continuum within a given style, but
explaining variance in these outcomes based on
differences between (and not only within)
styles. Our research contributes to the scholarly
discussion around Kirton's Adaption-
Innovation theory by offering an alternative
way to explain why those individuals who at-
tract attention by proliferating ideas may not
be those who produce original ideas. In this re-
gard, we also help organizations to assign crea-
tive tasks to the ‘right’ organizational members,
and hence, offer guidance for an important
stepping stone towards innovation in organiza-
tions: the generation of many and/or original
ideas.
Cognitive Styles and Creative
Outcomes
Cognitive styles are an individual's preferred
way of gathering, processing and evaluating in-
formation (Hayes & Allinson, 1994; Puccio &
Grivas, 2009). Thereby, cognitive styles inﬂu-
ence theway individuals perceive their environ-
ment in order to search for information, tomake
sense of it and to store it within their mental
models to make use of it for further actions.
Cognitive styles have been found to be at the
core of creative achievements (e.g., Kirton,
1976; Tierney, Farmer, & Graen, 1999).
One approach to understanding andmeasur-
ing cognitive styles that has received consider-
able attention in the literature is based on
Kirton's Adaption-Innovation theory (1976,
1994, 2003). Kirton (2003) posits that people
solve problems and develop solutions in differ-
ent ways. People can be placed on a bipolar con-
tinuum ranging from adaption to innovation on
three cognitive styles: originality, efﬁciency and
rule governance. The ﬁrst – originality – is sim-
ilar to Roger's (1959) concept of the ‘creative
loner’ who compulsively toys with ideas. Inno-
vators in this style do not bother about para-
digm structures but do proliferate ideas,
whereas adopters in this style operate within
the prevailing paradigm and prefer to produce
fewer but sound, useful and relevant ideas
(Kirton, 2003). The second – efﬁciency – is simi-
lar to Weber (1970) when describing bureau-
crats. Innovators in this style prefer to loosen
structure and shed detail, whereas adaptors
are concerned with precision, reliability and
attention to detail (Kirton, 1994). The third –
rule governance – resembles Merton (1957) in
his analysis of managers. The Mertonian
conformist, i.e. the adaptor, ﬁts well into organi-
zational settings as he has proper respect for au-
thority and rules, whereas the innovator is a
rule-breaker, who challenges or at least disre-
gards existing rules and structures (Kirton,
2003). AlthoughKirton (e.g., 1987, 2003; see also
Kaufmann, 2004) asserts that his measures cap-
ture creative styles (i.e., preferences), and not
creative levels (i.e., creative capability), the liter-
ature has continuously found innovation as
compared to adaption in the styles associated
with creative outcomes (e.g., Isaksen & Puccio,
1988; Miron-Spektor et al., 2011).
Although some research has aggregated
these three cognitive styles into one continuum
with two poles (e.g., Kirton, 1976), the broad
majority of research conﬁrmed a three-factor
structure, with inconsistent correlations
between the styles, and each style exerting dif-
ferent associations with outcome variables
(e.g., Isaksen & Puccio, 1988; Taylor, 1989b;
Bagozzi & Foxall, 1995), suggesting that three
different styles exist (Miron, Erez & Naveh,
2004). While, in principle, people can score high
onmeasures ofmore than one style, people tend
to have a strong preference for one style over
the others (Miron-Spektor et al., 2011). Whereas
traditional research on cognitive styles has ex-
tensively examined the outcome effects based
on an individual's positioning on the
adaption–innovation continuumwithin a given
style, the ﬁnding by Miron-Spektor and col-
leagues (2011) encourages researchers to direct
more attention to the effects of a high preference
for a certain style, i.e. explaining outcomes
based on differences between (and not only
within) styles. Miron-Spektor et al. (2011) as-
sume that only the originality style is associated
with idea generation, whereas the efﬁciency
and rule governance styles are associated
mainlywith idea implementation. This assump-
tion partly accords with more traditional ﬁnd-
ings. For example, Lowe and Taylor (1986)
show that the originality style is strongly associ-
ated with creative performance, whereas the ef-
ﬁciency style is associated with skills
performance, i.e. assiduous, penetrating, and
skilful work in the testing of ideas, rather than
with creative performance. Miron and col-
leagues (2004) found a positive correlation be-
tween attention-to-detail, which is similar to
efﬁciency, with performance quality but not
with innovation. Likewise, Isaksen and Puccio
(1988) do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant correlation be-
tween efﬁciency and any Torrance creativity
measure. However, as Miron-Spektor and col-
leagues (2011, p. 742) note, ‘[c]onformists’ ef-
fects on idea generation are less clear, because
research ﬁndings have been inconsistent’.
Two shortcomings in the literature might be
the reason for these inconsistent ﬁndings that
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concern not only the contribution of rule
governance to idea generation. The ﬁrst (analyt-
ical) shortcoming is the almost exclusive
analysis of zero-order correlations (e.g., Isaksen
& Puccio, 1988), which does not account for the
confounding correlation between the styles,
resulting in a biased estimate of the correlation
between any of the styles with an outcome var-
iable. These correlational ﬁndings on the cogni-
tive style-creative performance stem primarily
from early research. Yet, although we have
made substantial methodological advances to
date, this early research is still often cited and
used for building hypotheses and supporting
results (e.g., Kirton, 2003; Miron-Spektor et al.,
2011). Not controlling for correlations between
the styles, may have led to erroneously ﬁnding
comparable contributions of the different cogni-
tive styles on outcome variables.
The second (thematic and methodological)
shortcoming is the ignorance of one of Kirton's
central premises. Kirton premises in his A-I
theory that differences in cognitive styles ex-
plain how individuals prefer to produce ideas.
Hence, if individuals are not explicitly asked to
act in a particular way, they will generate ideas
in their preferredways. However, if asked to do
so, individuals may also be able to, for example,
generate a large number of ideas, irrespective of
their preferred cognitive style (Kirton, 2003).
This is important because some prior studies
have used different tests to capture creative
outcomes, such as ﬂuency and originality (c.f.
Isaksen and Puccio, 1988). Given that different
tests have different stimuli and the stimulus at
hand may inﬂuence participants’ response be-
haviour (Kim, 2006), clear differences in creative
outcomes as a function of a certain cognitive
style may be masked. For example, a certain
stimulus might be interpreted as asking for
many rather than innovative responses. Ac-
cording to Kirton (2003), this may cause more
or less favourable results in any of these tests, ir-
respective of their preferred cognitive style.
Omitting this premise may lead to a distortion
of the results when aiming at ﬁnding different
effects of the cognitive styles on certain outcome
variables, as in the context of our study.
Hypotheses
We propose that the cognitive styles ‘original-
ity’ and ‘rule governance’ contribute to idea
generation, whereas – as discussed in the previ-
ous section and in line with existing research
(e.g., Lowe & Taylor, 1986; Isaksen & Puccio,
1988; Miron et al., 2004; Miron-Spektor et al.,
2011) – we do not assume an effect of the cogni-
tive style efﬁciency on any of the outcome vari-
ables. Althoughwe assume that both originality
and rule governance contribute to idea genera-
tion, we argue that the styles differ in the kind
of idea generation, ﬂuency and originality they
affect. In the following, we present rationales
linking the creative styles ‘originality’ and ‘rule
governance’ to ﬂuency and originality in idea
generation.
The ﬁrst creative style – originality – differen-
tiates between sufﬁciency of originality on the
one hand and proliferation of originality on
the other (Kirton, 1994). Kirton's (2003) basic de-
scriptions of the two extremes start by stating
that people tending to sufﬁciency of originality
prefer to produce fewer ideas which are aimed
to be seen as sound and useful. In contrast, peo-
ple tending to proliferation of originality prefer
to proliferate ideas with low regard for the pre-
vailing structures andwith accepting that much
of their idea outputmay be discarded as long as
one or two pay off. Therefore, it can be assumed
that proliferation of originality is associated
with a high ﬂuency in idea generation. Isaksen
and Puccio (1988) report a positive and signiﬁ-
cant relationship between the creative style
originality and verbal ﬂuency. Thereby, they
provide empirical support for this relationship.
Arguing that team members possessing origi-
nality provide their teams with a large pool of
ideas from which to choose, Miron-Spektor
and colleagues (2011) ﬁnd a positive effect of
the proportion of such members on a team for
radical innovation. Discussing his own results
and prior research by Payne (1987), Taylor
(1989b, p. 305) concludes that the originality
scale ‘must be correlated with the capacity to
generate ideas’, regardless of quality.
Proliferators of ideas are less concerned, and
may not even notice the boundaries associated
with a particular paradigm. Accordingly, this
results in generating both paradigm-consistent
and paradigm-cracking ideas (Kirton, 2003).
Some of the many ideas they produce appear
more adaptive, others more innovative (Kirton,
1999). Taylor (1989b) recognizes that, with re-
spect to the originality style, A-I theory says
nothing about the quality of the ideas gener-
ated, and that the production of an abundance
of low quality ideas would accord with the
proliferator type. This facet of the proliferation
of originality type indicates why a clear effect
of this cognitive style on generating original
ideas cannot be expected.
Hypothesis 1. Proliferation of originality is
positively associated with ideational ﬂuency.
The cognitive style ‘rule governance’ differ-
entiates between rule-conforming and rule-
breaking managing structures (Kirton, 2003).
In this context, rule governance covers operat-
ing within policies, theories, conventions and
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consensus. Such a context has traditionally been
seen as contradictory of creativity, which re-
quires thinking outside the box (Miron-Spektor
et al., 2011). High levels of such conformity
may restrict the generation of original ideas, as
it suppresses deviations from acceptable norms
and standards (Goncalo & Staw, 2006). It also
restricts the expression of original, deviant
ideas, as rule-conformers fear receiving nega-
tive evaluations of their social or occupational
groups (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987). People with a
rule-breaking tendency, however, are less re-
sponsive to pressures to conform and are will-
ing to provoke challenging and unexpected
changes (Kirton, 2003). While conformers are
concerned about cohesion, rule-breakers are
willing to solve problems and develop ideas at
the expense of rule and group cohesion (Kirton,
2003). Especially for radical innovation, individ-
uals need to raise ideas that are nonstandard
and push these ideas, even at the risk of
challenging and provoking other people in the
organization (Janssen, 2003). Those with an
innovative tendency emphasize the importance
of unique, novel or original pathways (Isaksen,
Lauer & Wilson, 2003). In contrast,
Miron-Spektor and colleagues (2011, p. 742)
state that ‘conformists are usually not the cata-
lyst of radical ideas’. However, even smaller
scale innovations are likely to challenge the
existing framework of task relationships, infor-
mal norms, habits and expectations that co-
workers have (Janssen, 2003). Bringing in new
ideas to improve daily work processes and
work designs also brings uncertainty, insecurity
and stress. Often co-workers react with resis-
tance rather than with support (Jones, 2001).
Thus, individuals promoting original ideas
must be willing to break habits and preferences
for familiar practices, and risk a loss of cohesion,
i.e. they are rule-breakers.
Hypothesis 2. Rule-breaking is positively
associated with the generation of original ideas.
Methods
Sample and Procedure
Data has been collected online. The database for
our study consists of alumni from a Business
School (N=707). Since intelligence is often con-
sidered as a necessary but not sufﬁcient precon-
dition of creativity (Sternberg & O'Hara, 1999),
we only contacted potential participants hold-
ing a university degree, assuming that they
show a certain level of intelligence as well. As
we were interested in the creative styles and
performances of employees, we only contacted
individuals currently employed. As it can be
assumed that certain ranks, departments, ﬁrms
and industries have certain demands
concerning cognitive styles, we did not restrain
sampling to one homogeneous group. Instead,
we collected data in a variety of areas, aiming
to cover the whole range of cognitive styles.
The ﬁnal sample consisted of 191 individuals
(response rate about 27%), including 68 (about
36%) women, with ages ranging from 22 to
65years (M=32.47, SD=7.31). To ensure com-
mitment, we contacted each person personally
via e-mail. The e-mail contained some general
information about the purpose of the study, du-
ration of the survey and contact information for
potential questions. On the ﬁrst page, partici-
pants were asked to carefully read the instruc-
tions on every page and to answer the
questions thoroughly. They were further asked
to avoid potential disturbances that may occur
during the tests (e.g., by closing the door, mut-
ing their mobile phone). Besides these general
instructions, we gave examples before continu-
ing with the tests. For each test, the participants
had 120 seconds to come up with as many orig-
inal ideas as possible. After the time limit, the
page was switched automatically to the next
page. We also recorded the participants’
cognitive style as the independent variable and
socio-demographic variables as control
variables.
Measures
Originality and ﬂuency
To account for Kirton's note that individuals
may solve problems in a particularway (instead
of their preferred way if explicitly asked to do
so) we do not, unlike other studies in the past
(e.g., Isaksen & Puccio, 1988), use different sub-
tests for capturing performance in ideational
ﬂuency and originality (Torrance, 1974). Rather,
we only use one test description, expecting that
people with a preference for originality will
solve the test differently from people with a
preference for rule governance. Moreover, we
expect that this diverging reaction to a stimulus
holds in different creative tasks. Therefore, we
chose to analyse two kinds of ideation tasks that
the literature shows address important issues
organizations may be confronted with. The ﬁrst
task is ‘identifying unusual usage opportunities
for an article of daily use’, a task involving gen-
erating ideas away from the obvious or com-
mon (Torrance, 1974) and associating with
organizational outcomes such as innovation, es-
pecially radical innovation. The second task is
‘identifying similar expressions for a given
term’, a task involving generating ideas relating
to existing knowledge and associating with or-
ganizational outcomes such as imitation or
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incremental innovation. In more detail, for the
ﬁrst measure of ﬂuency and originality, we
adapted a subtest of Torrance's Test of Creative
Thinking (1974), asking the participants tomen-
tion as many unusual usage opportunities for a
tin. This test has turned out to be suitable for
measuring divergent productivity and allows
analysis for ideational ﬂuency and originality
(e.g., Kim, 2006). For the second measure, we
applied a creativity test by Schoppe (1975),
which is labelled ‘similarities’ and allows the
measurement of ideational ﬂuency and origi-
nality as well by using rather convergent think-
ing. The participants were asked to come up
with as many words that can be used to de-
scribe something ‘nice’.
For both tests, we computed two measures;
ideational ﬂuency and originality, which – in
line with other recent creativity studies such as
De Dreu, Baas and Nijstad (2008) – serve as
our study's dependent variables. For capturing
ideational ﬂuency, the number of unique ideas
generated per participant was counted. To ob-
tain a reliable measure of originality, two inde-
pendent coders rated each unique idea for its
originality, which – following De Dreu and col-
leagues (2008) – was deﬁned as ‘an idea or sug-
gestion that is infrequent, novel and original’
(from 1=not original to 5=very original). For
both tasks, the unusual use task (rwg=0.85,
ICC(1) = 0.70, ICC(2) = 0.82) and the similarity
task (rwg=0.89, ICC(1) = 0.66, ICC(2) = 0.80)
inter-rater agreement was very high and hence
satisfactory (LeBreton & Senter, 2008). Differ-
ences between raterswere solved by discussion.
We use the value they agreed on for the follow-
ing calculation of the average originality in a re-
spondent's answers.
Cognitive styles
We measure the participants’ cognitive styles
with the well-established Kirton Adaption-
Innovation Inventory (KAI, Kirton, 1976). KAI
appears to be a reliable and valid tool for
distinguishing innovative individuals from
adaptive individuals along the three facets orig-
inality, efﬁciency and rule governance (Kirton,
2003). An increasing body of research has ex-
amined the different effects of the facets instead
of the superordinate construct in order to gain a
more detailed understanding of cognitive style
(e.g., Miron et al., 2004) and given inconsistent
(and in some studies, negative) correlations
between facets (e.g., Loo & Shiomi, 1997) and
their differing consequences (e.g.,
Miron-Spektor et al., 2011). To measure origi-
nality, efﬁciency and rule governance, we
applied the abridged 13-item version of KAI,
which has been validated in numerous studies
(Taylor, 1989a; Bagozzi & Foxall, 1995). This
version is most likely to avoid problems of
multicollinearity when investigating the effects
of the three facets on a dependent variable
(Bagozzi & Foxall, 1995).
Participants indicated on a seven-point re-
sponse scale their agreement or disagreement
with the statements attached to the items. The
Cronbach's alphas in our sample for the three
KAI dimensions, originality, rule governance
and efﬁciency, were 0.83, 0.64 and 0.75, which
is in line with the expected values based on
prior studies (see the literature overviews in
Bagozzi & Foxall, 1995 or Kirton, 2003). We
used conﬁrmatory factor analysis to further ex-
amine the reliability and validity of our mea-
sures. The three-factor structure yielded an
acceptable ﬁt (CFI = 0.91; RMSEA=0.08;
SRMR=0.07) and all item loadings were signif-
icant, indicating construct and discriminant va-
lidity. Moreover, the three-factor model
produced a signiﬁcantly better ﬁt than a model
in which the three dimensions were collapsed
into one factor (CFI= 0.56; RMSEA=0.16;
SRMR=0.14; p<0.001), underlining our as-
sumption of three distinct factors as opposed
to one continuum. The relatively low or even
negative correlations between the dimensions
(see Table 1) are in line with results in other
studies such as those of Miron and colleagues
(2004) and give credence to our approach of
analysing originality, efﬁciency and rule gover-
nance as distinct factors.
Control variables
Previous literature suggests that gender and age
may be associated with creative style, creative
performance, or both (Kirton, 2003). To control
for potential confounding effects, we included
these two variables in our analysis. Previous re-
search also suggests that if a person produces a
large number of alternatives, it is more likely
that they also produce original ones (e.g.,
Dixon, 1979). We therefore control for ﬂuency
when examining originality by testing how far
our hypothesized relationships change when
controlling for ﬂuency.
Results
Having ensured the applicability, reliability and
validity of our data, we canmove on to evaluat-
ing the hypotheses. Table 1 shows descriptive
statistics for, and correlations among, the
study's variables.
In order to test Hypothesis 1, we present two
series of three hierarchical regressions, with the
ﬁrst series examining ﬂuency in the unusual us-
age task and the second one examining ﬂuency
in the similarities task. Model 1a of Table 2
shows that the two control variables age and
gender only explain 1% of variance in ﬂuency
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in the unusual usage task, with none of the var-
iables exerting a signiﬁcant effect on the depen-
dent variable. In Model 1b, we added the
cognitive style originality. As hypothesized,
originality is signiﬁcantly associated with ﬂu-
ency (β=0.23, p<0.01). The inclusion of origi-
nality explained an additional 5% (p< 0.01) of
the variance in ﬂuency (R2=0.06). As a robust-
ness check, we added the other two cognitive
styles in Model 1c. The effect of originality is al-
most unchanged (β=0.22, p<0.01) and, as ex-
pected, neither inefﬁciency (β=0.01, n.s.) nor
rule-breaking (β=0.05, n.s.) is signiﬁcantly as-
sociated with the dependent variable. The vari-
ance explained is almost unchanged at 6%.
Giving even more credence to our Hypothesis
1, the results for the dependent variable ﬂuency
in the similarities task are strikingly compara-
ble. As shown in Model 2a, the two control var-
iables are non-signiﬁcant and explain only 1%
of variance in the dependent variable. The in-
clusion of originality in Model 2b explained
an additional 3% (p< 0.05) of the variance in
ﬂuency (R2=0.03), with originality signiﬁcantly
associating with ﬂuency (β=0.16, p< 0.05).
Adding inefﬁciency (β=0.00, n.s.) and rule-
breaking (β=0.07, n.s.) does not signiﬁcantly af-
fect the effect of originality (β=0.17, p<0.05)
and does not lead to a signiﬁcant increase in
R2 of ﬂuency in the similarity task. Taking both
sets of analysis together, Hypothesis 1 is
supported.
Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations among Variables
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Age 32.47 7.31
2. Gender (1= female; 2=male) 1.64 0.48 0.08
3. Cognitive Style: Originality 5.21 0.85 0.11 0.05
4. Cognitive Style: Inefﬁciency 2.83 0.90 0.04 0.07 0.33
5. Cognitive Style: Rule-breaking 3.81 0.93 0.17 0.01 0.11 0.17
6. Fluency (unusual usage) 6.80 2.90 0.04 0.11 0.22 0.06 0.07
7. Originality (unusual usage) 1.57 0.44 0.02 0.21 0.13 0.03 0.21 0.25
8. Fluency (similarity) 10.58 3.90 0.01 0.08 0.16 0.04 0.08 0.36 0.10
9. Originality (similarity) 1.56 0.36 0.22 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.26 0.08 0.24 0.08
Note. N=191.
Correlations of |0.15| and above are signiﬁcant at a 0.05 level (two-tailed).
Correlations of |0.19| and above are signiﬁcant at a 0.01 level (two-tailed).
Correlations of |0.24| and above are signiﬁcant at a 0.001 level (two-tailed).
Table 2. Hierarchical Regression Analyses Predicting Fluency in Two Different Tasks
Fluency in the unusual usage task Fluency in the similarity task
Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c
Age 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.01
Gender 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.07
Originality 0.23** 0.22** 0.16* 0.17*
Inefﬁciency 0.01 0.00
Rule-breaking 0.05 0.07
F-statistic 1.21 4.16** 2.58* 0.64 2.05 1.36
R2 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.04
Change in R2 0.05** 0.00 0.03* 0.00
Note. N=191. Two-tailed tests were performed. Standardized regression coefﬁcients are reported in the table.
Signiﬁcance levels:
* p< 0.05
** p< 0.01
*** p< 0.001
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To test Hypothesis 2, the ﬁrst series of hierar-
chical regressions applies originality in the un-
usual usage task as dependent variable and
the second series has originality in the similari-
ties task as dependent variable. As depicted in
Model 3a in Table 3, the two control variables
account for 5% of variance in the dependent
variable, with gender (β=0.21, p< 0.01) having
a signiﬁcant association with originality in the
unusual usage task. The inclusion of rule-
breaking inModel 3b is associatedwith a signif-
icant increase (p< 0.01) of 5% in the variance in
the dependent variable (R2=0.09). As hypothe-
sized, rule-breaking is positively linked with
originality in the unusual usage task (β=0.22,
p< 0.01). In Model 3c, we added the creative
style variables originality and inefﬁciency. Nei-
ther exert a signiﬁcant effect on the dependent
variable (originality: β=0.13, n.s.; inefﬁciency:
β=0.03, n.s.), nor do they affect notably the
rule-breaking–originality relationship (β=0.20,
p<0.01), nor is the variance explained notably
changed (R2 = 0.10). Model 3d functions as an
additional robustness check and includes ﬂu-
ency as additional independent variable to ex-
plain originality. Even if ﬂuency has a
signiﬁcant association with originality (β=0.25,
p< 0.001) and comes with an increase in vari-
ance explained (R2 = 0.16), it does not alter the
effects of interest signiﬁcantly.
With respect to the alternative dependent
variable, originality in the similarity task, we
found that in our control variable model (Model
4a) only age is signiﬁcantly associated with
originality (β=0.22, p< 0.05). The two controls
account for 5% of variance in the dependent
variable. Again in line with Hypothesis 2, rule-
breaking is signiﬁcantly associated with origi-
nality in the similarity task (β=0.23, p<0.01)
and its inclusion leads to a signiﬁcant change
of 5% (p<0.01) in the variance explained
(R2=0.10). Model 4c adds the effects of the cog-
nitive styles originality and inefﬁciency. Again,
the effect of rule-breaking is not strongly af-
fected (β=0.22, p< 0.01). The cognitive style
originality is not related to the generation of
original ideas in the similarity task (β=0.08, n.
s.), as is inefﬁciency (β=0.00, n.s.). There is a
non-signiﬁcant increase in variance explained
(R2= 0.11). Model 4d adds ﬂuency as the inde-
pendent variable. However, ﬂuency does not
signiﬁcantly associate with originality (β=0.05,
n.s.). It does not alter the effects of interest and
does not change the variance explained in orig-
inality. Taking both series together, Hypothesis
2 is supported.
Discussion and Implications
Ideas are the rawmaterial necessary for innova-
tion. Eliciting ideas with innovation potential
from their employees can serve as a strong com-
petitive advantage for organizations. Prior re-
search suggests a positive relationship
between the number of ideas produced with
Table 3. Hierarchical Regression Analyses Predicting Originality in Two Different Tasks
Originality in the unusual usage
task
Originality in the similarity
task
Model
3a
Model
3b
Model
3c
Model
3d
Model
4a
Model
4b
Model
4c
Model
4d
Age 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.22** 0.18* 0.17* 0.17*
Gender 0.21** 0.21** 0.22* 0.24*** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Originality 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.07
Inefﬁciency 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00
Rule-breaking 0.22** 0.20** 0.19** 0.23** 0.22** 0.22**
Fluency (unusual usage) 0.25***
Fluency (similarity) 0.05
F-statistic 4.24* 6.13*** 4.30** 5.91*** 4.71* 6.86*** 4.34*** 3.67**
R2 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.16 0.05 0.10 0.11 0.11
Change in R2 0.05** 0.02 0.06*** 0.05** 0.01 0.00
Note. N=191. Two-tailed tests were performed. Standardized regression coefﬁcients are reported in the table.
Signiﬁcance levels:
* p< 0.05
** p< 0.01
*** p< 0.001
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their originality (e.g., Isaksen & Puccio, 1988;
Kim, 2006). Yet, little empirical research has
been carried out so far to explain why this
should be the case. We have suggested an alter-
native view, which states that the cognitive
styles ‘originality’ and ‘rule governance’ differ-
ently affect ﬂuency and originality in idea gener-
ation. Our results are strikingly consistent and
support our theoretical reasoning. In both tasks,
the cognitive style originality and no other
cognitive style affected ideational ﬂuency sig-
niﬁcantly. Likewise, only rule governance
affected the originality of ideas generated in
both tasks. This linkwas not affected by control-
ling for ﬂuency as an additional independent
variable. Thereby we give further credence to
existing knowledge and add several new
insights to the discussion on the effects of
cognitive styles.
While Kirton – in his original works (e.g.,
1976) – has asserted that there should be no
correlation between preferences for idea
production represented by innovation–adaptor
differences in the cognitive styles and the ac-
tual capacity to produce ideas, we ﬁnd strong
differences between adaptors and innovators
in the styles ‘originality’ and ‘rule gover-
nance’. This is, however, not surprising given
that Kirton (2003) himself contrasted the sufﬁ-
ciency (adaptor) type of originality and the
proliferation (innovator) type of originality
along their tendency to produce few or many
ideas in his later work. He stated, accordingly,
that the former type will prefer and tend to
produce fewer ideas and the latter type will
prefer and tend to produce many ideas
(Kirton & Pender, 1982; Kirton, 1994, 2003).
Hence our work contradicts Kirton's (1976) ini-
tial premise that cognitive styles are not re-
lated to creative outcomes. Admittedly, the
cognitive style ‘efﬁciency’ is associated neither
with the production of many ideas nor with
the production of original ideas. This ﬁnding
replicates existing studies that did not ﬁnd a
link between efﬁciency and creative outcomes
(e.g., Lowe & Taylor, 1986; Isaksen & Puccio,
1988). However, and in line with existing
studies such as those by Isaksen and Puccio
(1988) or Goldsmith and Matherly (1987), we
found differences between adopters and inno-
vators in how their cognitive styles are related
to idea generation. Goldsmith and Matherly
(1987) found that originality has the strongest
association with creative outcomes in general.
While our research supports that the cognitive
style originality is the mean for creating many
ideas, for creating original ideas the cognitive
style rule-breaking seems to be crucial. Hence,
our analysis reveals signiﬁcant differences
between the cognitive styles and their
relationships to idea generation. Thereby we
also extend Isaksen and Puccio (1988), who
found both originality and rule-breaking
related to both ﬂuency and originality in
ideation but only conducted a correlational
analysis that might have masked existing dif-
ferences when considering all cognitive styles
simultaneously.
Drawing on more recent research of
Miron-Spektor and colleagues (2011), who
encouraged identifying the unique contribu-
tions of the different cognitive styles offered by
Kirton, we empirically examined Kirton's
(2003) assumption of preferred ways of
problem-solving and idea generation by giving
the participants an implicit choice between the
two outcomes (multitude versus originality).
Our results are strikingly clear. In line with
our hypotheses, the style originality affects ide-
ational ﬂuency and the rule governance style af-
fects originality of ideas generated. Importantly,
differences in the originality style do not affect
the production of original ideas and differences
in the rule governance style do not affect the
multitude of ideas (ﬂuency).
Taken together, our study reveals that two of
the three cognitive styles are related to idea gen-
eration outcomes and extends existing ﬁndings
in regard to differentiation. Hence, the main
conclusion to be drawn from our study is that
the different cognitive styles of KAI provide
very different results in idea generation tasks.
Thus, our research indicates that different
cognitive styles, i.e. originality and rule-
governance, are needed for generating either a
multitude or original ideas.
With regard to our research question, a sin-
gle person can complement both cognitive
requirements of idea generation. However,
this combination is rare. Only 8.4% of the indi-
viduals in our study scored highly (5 or
above) on both originality and rule-breaking
(see Miron-Spektor et al., 2011 for a similar
result). More often people tend to have one
preferred cognitive style that they will use.
As the cognitive style does not say anything
about the ability to perform in the other cate-
gory, people might excel in both, generating
many and original ideas. However, this
cognitive switch must be triggered by the task
description.
Therefore, our paper contributes in two im-
portant ways. First we deepen the understand-
ing of the underlying constructs composing
the KAI. Although Kirton's inventory has been
used for almost 40 years as a single scale used
to measure cognitive style as one dimension,
or as three aligned sub-scores still representing
one underlying higher-order factor (innovation
vs. adaption), our results provide further
conﬁrmatory evidence of the structure of the
three-factor model and more importantly, of
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the different effects on idea generation. These
conclusions, taken in the context of the criti-
cisms by Payne (1987) and the recent ﬁndings
by Miron-Spektor and colleagues (2011), have
implications for the future of the use of the
KAI inventory. Importantly, the inventory
should no longer be used as a single scale as
people might have all possible combinations of
scores in the three dimensions. Mediocre scores,
however, do not necessarily measure mediocre
creativity. For many people, middle scores
might just be a conﬂation between the different
dimensions. More attention should be paid to
differences between the styles and not only to
differences within the styles. Hence, people
might score high on either originality or
rule-breaking both of which can be a sign for a
creative element – either for ﬂuency or for
originality.
Second, we give a cognitive explanation for
the underlying cognitive mechanisms of idea
generation. This understanding might further
help guide the development of new techniques
that produce more high quality ideas. Hence,
not only from a theoretical but also from a
practical point of view, our insights are helpful
– particularly, when organizations strive for
radical changes. Among a plenitude of ideas,
particularly original ideas bear the potential
for radical innovation. Hence to arrive at
original ideas, organizations should rely on
members that can be characterized by a
rule-breaking style.
Yet, given a particular organizational setting,
a successful innovation might either depend on
its radical uniqueness or on its timely or speciﬁc
improvement. Timely and/or speciﬁc improve-
ments often do not depend on a single radical
invention. Instead, they might be related to po-
tential application markets that may not yet ex-
ist, to alternative technological development
directions around speciﬁc problems, to
manufacturing processes or to alternative busi-
ness models (O'Connor & McDermott, 2004).
Whereas for original ideas the feasibility aspect
should be ignored until an idea is selected, ideas
that need to be implemented quickly andwith a
minimum of ﬁnancial resources, the originality
aspect should get less attention. Hence, depend-
ing on the needs of an organization, ﬁrms either
need highly original ideas, that challenge the
status quo, or rather develop alternative ideas
that rely on existing products, services and solu-
tions and hence can be implemented easily and
in a timely fashion.
Whereas the organizational circumstances
cannot be inﬂuenced by our ﬁndings, we can
make suggestions about whom to ask in an orga-
nization and how to ask. More speciﬁcally, orga-
nizations should rely onmembers with a strong
rule-breaking tendency to generate original
ideas and on members with a natural tendency
for the cognitive style originality for generating
a multitude of ideas.
Limitations and Future Research
In our study, we focused on the generation of
ideas. This is based on the two rationales that
(1) only original ideas have the potential for
breakthrough innovation and organizations
prefer one breakthrough idea over a plenitude
of mediocre ideas (Girotra, Terwiesch & Ulrich,
2010), and (2) idea ﬂuency may be necessary for
a timely and/or speciﬁc improvements within
an organization. This understanding is both
practically and theoretically relevant as it helps
understand how organizations gain competi-
tive advantage. Nevertheless, future research
is invited to compare our results regarding the
generation of ideas with the complementary
factor of usefulness of ideas as innovation pro-
cesses include several additional steps, such as
idea selection, idea combination, idea promo-
tion and idea implementation (Caniëls, De
Stobbeleir & De Clippeleer, 2014). Besides the
fact that adequately considering all these steps
in one research project would exceed the limit
of the explicable, each of the named process
steps may include additional or alternative
processes, along with a deviation from our
cognitive perspective. The idea selection step,
for example, involves social processes such as
negotiations in which self-assertion may be
more important than cognitive styles. We
encourage future research to test these addi-
tional factors from a process perspective within
groups.
Further, all of our participants hold a univer-
sity degree, which limits the generalizability of
our results to this group. As mentioned, we
did so to ensure a comparable and certain level
of intelligence as a minimum of intelligence is
supposed to be a necessary precondition for cre-
ativity. Additionally,we assume that those indi-
viduals play important roles in organizations.
Future research might include additional, or
examine other, populations.
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